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INTRODUCTION
The family of business cycle models the MNB workshop was
centred around (tagged ‘DSGE’- models from the
abbreviation of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
3)
has become the common language of macroeconomists
interested in recessions, booms and the best fiscal and
monetary policy responses to them. Macroeconomists
working with these – quite complicated – models generally
agree that it is not enough to assume that economic agents
(households, firms, banks) follow simple behavioural rules
(e.g. 80% of households take foreign currency-denominated
debt and 20% of them domestic), because a new policy (e.g.
a change from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange
rate regime) might make them change their behaviour (e.g.
households might be less willing to take credit denominated
in foreign currency that is subject to exchange rate
fluctuations).
4 Rather, if the main purpose of the model is to
learn something about the appropriate policy, it is suitable to
assume that agents are more clever than to follow simple
rules; they recognise their possibilities and the effects of
various economic policies on them. These models, therefore,
‘DSGE Models: A Closer Look at the Workhorse of Macroeconomics’ was the title of the international workshop organised for
the 8th time by the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) jointly with the London-based Center for Economic Policy Research on 3-4
September 2009. The recent sub-prime debacle, the resulting financial meltdown and the substantial policy responses gave the
topicality of the event; even more so as the unexpected extent of the crisis stirred a heated debate within and outside the
economics profession about the applicability and usefulness of the current business cycle models.
2 The keynote speakers of the
event were professors Lawrence Christiano (Northwestern University) and Mark Gertler (New York University, NYU), who are
both world-renowned for their essential and continuing contributions to the development of the current versions of business cycle
models. The keynote speakers with the 15 presenters from 10 countries and their discussants provided important attempts to
challenge or defend basic assumptions of the models (e.g. sticky developments in prices or rational and forward-looking
expectations); argue for adding long missing factors (e.g. an explicit financial sector and imperfect credit markets) to the models,
or for dropping others (e.g. money-demand) which seem non-essential. There was general agreement among the participants with
Governor of the MNB András Simor, who said that in the current crisis ‘we need [models of business cycles] more than ever,’ but
they need to be developed further to be able to analyse and quantify factors that the current crisis showed essential.
‘...whimsicality, a willingness to play with ideas, is not merely entertaining
but essential in times like these. Never trust an aircraft designer who refuses
to play with model airplanes, and never trust an economic pundit
who refuses to play with model economies.’
Paul Krugman
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1 Péter Benczúr, Anna Naszódi, Katrin Rabitsch, Katalin Szilágyi and Balázs Világi contributed to the article. 
2 See for example a Survey of the Economist journal, a response of Chicago University professor Robert Lucas, and the resulting debate; or the debate Crisis and
Macroeconomy of Hungarian economists on the eltecon blog (in Hungarian). 
3 It is a general name for any model with some basic methodological traits. While earlier models assumed some basic static behavioural equations (like individuals tend
to consume a certain fraction of their current paycheck), these more complicated models assume that economic agents make dynamic and forward looking decisions,
(i.e. they take into consideration not only their current income, but also their expected future income when deciding about current consumption. Also they take
uncertainty (stochastic world) explicitly into consideration, meaning they buy insurances against events (e.g. fire) that would cause disruption in their consumption.
The term general equilibrium means that these models are interested in the behaviour of the whole economy and not only that of the individual agents, and for this
reason, they are looking for prices, wages and interest rates, where the whole economy is in an equilibrium, where the demand and supply equal in each markets and
nobody want to change their decisions.
4 It is the famous ‘Lucas-critique’named after the Nobel-prize winning Chicago economist Robert Lucas, who famously recognised this problem with earlier non-micro-
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explicitly model the agents’ behaviour consistently with the
model economy. 
As one of the keynote speakers, Mark Gertler emphasised it,
these models were developed to explain and support policy
in ‘normal’ times, and they were relatively successful at this.
By providing a common language for macroeconomists of
different schools, this framework allowed researchers to
debate about and agree on the necessary ingredients that
these models need in order to be able to explain essential
real-world characteristics. For policy applications, the models
have proved useful not only in giving some basic intuition
about the appropriate policy (such as that the nominal
interest rate increase should exceed the increase in inflation
if policy wants to stabilise inflation (Taylor-principle), or that
an appropriate fiscal policy should try to smooth tax rates
over time), but they also provided tools for quantitative
evaluations of the appropriate policy stance. The models,
therefore, allowed policy makers to make more informed
decisions. The current crisis, however, has shown that
important ingredients are missing from these models: for
example, standard DSGE models
5 have left out financial
markets from their estimated models, even though in their
1999 article current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke with Mark
Gertler (NYU) and Simon Gilchrist (Boston University)
developed the tools necessary to insert financial sector into
these models and showed that the resulting ‘financial
accelerator’ mechanism would influence the reaction of these
model economies to economic shocks – i.e. financial markets
matter (see below). It is clear that the current crisis cannot be
understood without financial markets – either as a source or
as a propagator of shocks – and proper model-based policy
advice could not be made without a model that takes
financial markets seriously. The number of, and the general
interest in, papers in the workshop that deal with financial
markets prove that macroeconomists are taking this challenge
seriously and are working hard to develop the proper models. 
MODELLING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
In a perfect world with no information problems, banks and
financial markets could be ignored for business cycle analysis:
they can instead be considered as the extension of the central
bank that uses its instruments to influence financial markets
to obtain a level of market interest rates or the money supply
it considers appropriate. Credit in this world would flow
freely to every firm that can invest it profitably. That is
probably the reason why the first generation of DSGE models
has not considered it necessary to explicitly model financial
markets. 
An important exception from this was the model of
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999 (BGG) that abandoned
the unrealistic perfect information assumption and assumed
that firms know more about their own profitability than the
banks they want to borrow from. Banks need to pay
monitoring costs if they want to observe the firms’
profitability. As it was shown earlier by Townsend, 1979, this
setup justifies the standard debt contracts between banks and
firms: the borrowing firm promises to pay interest to the
bank, and, in case it becomes insolvent, the bank – in a
standard default procedure by paying the monitoring cost –
observes all its assets and collects everything it can. For this
contract to be acceptable for the bank, the interest rate it
receives in good times should cover its opportunity costs
(government interest) plus the expected value of its losses in
the case of default. This way the model can capture and
explain the interest rate premium (the excess interest rate the
borrower pays over the risk free interest) generally observed
in real world debt contracts. But the model can say more than
this: it shows that in (general) equilibrium this premium will
be dependent on the proportion of the firms’ own funds (net
worth) to the amount it intends to borrow. The lower its own
funds are, the higher the premium will be, as it reduces the
expected amount the bank can recover in the case of default.
The authors show that this leads to an economy level
‘financial accelerator’ mechanism that influences the
propagation of standard business cycle shocks: a negative
shock leads to lower investment and lower price of capital,
which, in turn, causes losses for firms and reduces their net
worth. But this increases their borrowing costs that make
them to invest even less. This ‘credit channel’ thus amplifies
the effects of the original shocks. The authors show that this
amplification effect is quantitatively important for standard
values of the model parameters. 
Both of the keynote speakers presented variants of the
‘financial accelerator’ model and argued that it offers a
fruitful starting point for incorporating financial markets into
the business cycle models. Lawrence Christiano presented a
recent paper that he is working on with Roberto Motto
(European Central Bank, ECB) and Massimo Rostagno
(ECB). The main aim of the paper is to insert financial
markets and banks into the standard business cycle model
with a rich set of shocks and potential propagation
mechanisms and use financial market data (including stock
markets, monetary aggregates and interest rate premium) to
identify which shocks and mechanisms help most in
explaining the data. A new shock the keynote speaker
introduced to his model is a ‘risk shock’ that influences the
riskiness of credit, leading to worsened credit conditions:
5 Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans, 2005, or Smets and Wouters, 2007.WORKSHOP ON BUSINESS CYCLE MODELING
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higher premium and lower credit levels. The reason is that a
higher risk level increases the potential difference between
firms, which – because of the specific assumptions of the
model
6 – makes the potential losses of the banks higher. Even
news about future risk shocks can strongly influence stock
markets and the real economy, according to the model. The
authors show that this shock helps explain the behaviour of
financial market variables (such as the stock market and the
interest rate premium), and has significant effects on real
variables (e.g. output and investment). These results
underline, according to the authors, that financial markets
matter not only as propagators of shocks – as the standard
BGG model suggested – but also as independent sources of
shocks. A further important message of his speech was that
explicitly modelling the money supply process (i.e. the
liability side of the banking sector) either as a source of
shocks or as a propagation mechanism does not seem to
matter. This supports the conventional view that dropping
money from the analysis – and assuming that monetary policy
sets interest rates directly – is sufficient for general questions
of business cycle research (see, for example, Woodford,
2003), and the current crisis does not seem to invalidate this
result. 
It was also the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet
(e.g. buying mortgage backed securities) and not its liability
side (e.g. increased bank reserves) that Mark Gertler in his
keynote speech found important for understanding the
current crisis and the unconventional monetary policy
response. In his presentation, he admitted that the recent
‘credit-easing’ policy of the US Federal Reserve indeed led to
substantial increases in the narrow definitions of money (M0:
cash and bank reserves increased by close to $1 trillion). But
he emphasised that, contrary to ‘normal’ times, this entailed
a much smaller increase in broader money aggregates (M1:
cash and bank deposits outside the banking system increased
by less than $300 billion), which might be considered
potentially inflationary. The main reason for this is that US
banks now hold unusually high amounts of reserves at the
Federal Reserve (an increase of $800 billion). Through this,
they practically finance the central bank in its credit
operations. It should also be noted that the Fed now pays
positive interest on these reserves, and by changing the
reserve rate it can keep these reserves at the central bank and
thus can avoid unintended increases in the money supply
during the normalisation of the financial markets. Besides
bank reserves, the Fed is further financed by short-term debt
issued by the Treasury under the Supplementary Financing
Program. From these sources the Fed is providing credit to
various sectors of the economy. The Fed’s policy, therefore,
can be considered more as substituting the private sector in
financial intermediation (‘credit easing’) than increasing the
money supply in the economy (‘quantitative easing’), as was
also explained by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke in an earlier
speech.
In this vein, Mark Gertler continued his speech by presenting
the results of a paper he is working on with Peter Karadi
(MNB) which explicitly models the banking sector and shows
how this credit easing policy can be inserted into a financial
accelerator model. In this model, the banks are the
‘interesting’ agents that face credit constraints (not the firms
as in the BGG model). The reason for this in the paper is
moral hazard: the chief executive of the bank can divert a
certain fraction of the capital. The model household knows
about this, and restricts the amount of credit a certain bank
can obtain relative to its net worth, ensuring that no stealing
happens in equilibrium. This modelling technique leads to a
financial accelerator mechanism that is equivalent to the one
of BGG: there will be an interest rate premium in the
economy that is caused by the credit constraint of the banks
which becomes tighter if their net worth drops relative to
their assets (i.e. their leverage ratio increases). 
To model the current unconventional monetary policy of the
Fed, the model assumes that the central bank can offer credit
to firms without the same credit constraints that banks face.
On the other hand, the model assumes that the government
is not as good at allocating funds as banks, consequently, it
loses a certain fraction of the direct credit it provides as an
efficiency loss. 
The paper captures some important features of the current
crisis by assuming that it was triggered by a ‘capital quality
shock’: the value of the housing stock was not as high as
market participants expected. A drop such as this in a
standard model without a financial sector would result in a
short-lived recession with higher investment quickly
increasing the capital to its previous levels. With an explicitly
modelled financial sector, however, the drop in the value of
capital translates into a drop in the banks’ net worth
(amplified by their leverage), which reduces their ability to
obtain funds and thus to provide the credit that would be
necessary for a speedy recovery. Their gradual deleveraging
makes the recession more prolonged. Through providing
direct credit to the economy, the central bank can
substantially reduce the severity and length of the recession
caused by the shock. The paper shows that for relatively low
efficiency costs (less than 40 basis points yearly) optimal
policy fully substitutes for private intermediation during the
6The lognormal distribution of firm level shocks. MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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crisis, while for higher efficiency costs it is optimal not to
provide direct credit at all. This result justifies the Fed’s
behaviour (also required by law), namely, that it only
provides credit to very high grade debtors with sufficient
collateral (where the efficiency or default costs can be
expected to be very low).
In his workshop presentation of his paper written jointly with
S. Boragan Arouba (University of Maryland), Frank
Schorfheide (University of Pennsylvania) challenged the
conventional wisdom that the role of money can be ignored
in these DSGE models. He argued that a possible reason why
standard methods
7 found such a small role for money is the
simplistic way they quantified the reason for money demand.
The presented paper explicitly models the role of money
(applying results of search-based monetary theory introduced
by Kiyotaki-Wright, 1989): it assumes that there is a sector in
the economy where the one-shot and anonymous nature of
trade makes money necessary – as credit is inadmissible and
the chances of a successful barter are very low. The estimated
model implies that this sector matters quantitatively and
mainly because a positive interest rate is a distortionary tax
on money holdings, welfare considerations should be a factor
supporting a lower inflation target. 
LEARNING IN BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS
Since the 1970s, it has been assumed in most academic
macroeconomic models that key economic agents’
expectations are based on a sophisticated knowledge of the
working of the economy and all available relevant
information. This approach of describing expectations is the
rational expectations (RE) hypothesis. This assumption is
justified by the belief that if agents formed their expectations
naively, there would be unexploited profit opportunities;
however, in a market economy such phenomena do not
survive in the long run.
The RE hypothesis has important implications accepted by
even the non-academic community: For example, the
importance of central banks’ credibility and expectations
management in the conduct of monetary policy can be derived
from RE. On the other hand, in a world where economic
agents form their expectations simply by extrapolating some
past experience without any forward-looking considerations
the above issues would be much less important. 
Despite its appealing properties, the RE assumption has
problematic features as well. It implies that economic agents’
forecasts are always unbiased and have only unsystematic
errors. However, empirical evidence contradicts these strong
requirements.
Recently, there is a growing macroeconomic literature which
wants to refine our knowledge on expectations formations. It
wants to get rid of the most extreme characteristics of the RE
hypothesis, without returning to the assumption of naive and
purely backward-looking expectations. While, according to
the RE hypothesis, economic agents always use the best
possible forecasting models and know precisely the
appropriate parameter values of these models, the new
literature of learning assumes that agents’ forecasting models
have limited abilities and the exact values of the parameters
are discovered only gradually. In the workshop three papers
were presented on learning and expectations. 
Sergey Slobodan (CERGE-EI, Prague) and Raf Wouters
(National Bank of Belgium) estimated and compared
different versions of a DSGE model with and without RE
using US data. They replaced RE with different forecasting
algorithms in their DSGE model and analysed how deviation
from the RE hypothesis influenced the empirical properties
of the model. They find that replacing RE with learning
improves significantly the empirical fit of the model, and,
especially, inflation dynamics are explained much better.
They also demonstrated that learning leads to substantial
time variation in the parameters of the forecasting
algorithms: the beliefs about the dynamics of the inflation
process turn out to be very important for the overall
performance of the model.
Arturo Ormeno (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) presented a paper
on how the information content of survey expectations of
inflation can be used in estimating DSGE models. He
estimated a DSGE model using US data and found that the
ability of the model to explain the cross correlation of
inflation and survey inflation expectations data was very
weak. Then, he specified a forecasting model based on
learning and estimated it using survey expectations. He
demonstrated that survey expectations can be approximated
by simple models with few regressors where private agents
heavily discard past information. Furthermore, he combined
the DSGE model with the above forecasting model and re-
estimated it. He found that the empirical fit of the model
complemented with learning improved significantly. To
summarise, both papers suggest that it is a promising research
agenda to replace RE by learning algorithms in DSGE models.
Cosmin Ilut (Duke University) tried to resolve the uncovered
interest rate parity (UIP) puzzle. According to the UIP
7The standard methods assume that the real value of money provides some direct utility for the households that hold them (money-in-the-utility), or that households
need money in advance to buy consumption goods (cash-in-advance).WORKSHOP ON BUSINESS CYCLE MODELING
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hypothesis, periods when the domestic interest rate is higher
than the foreign interest rate should be followed by periods
of domestic currency depreciation. An implication of UIP is
that a regression of realised exchange rate changes on interest
rate differentials should produce a coefficient of 1. However,
empirical studies strongly reject this conjecture. This anomaly
is called the UIP puzzle. Although it is possible to explain the
UIP puzzle by models with RE, they do not provide plausible
solutions.
Instead, in the presented paper agents’ knowledge is more
limited than the requirements of the RE hypothesis. They do
not know exactly the statistical process governing interest
rate differentials. Moreover, it is assumed that they form
their conjecture on the properties of the above process in a
pessimistic way: they try to prepare for the worst-case
scenario. As a consequence, agents, who want to invest in the
higher interest rate bond by borrowing in the lower interest
rate bond underestimate the future interest rate differential:
they believe that it is more likely that observed increases in
the investment differential have been generated by temporary
shocks, while decreases are reflecting more persistent shocks. 
Hence, on average, next period investors are surprised to
observe a higher interest rate differential than expected. This
updating effect creates the possibility that next period the
agent finds it optimal to invest even more in the investment
currency because this higher estimate raises the present value
of the future payoffs of investing in the higher interest rate
bond. Increased demand will drive up the value of the
investment currency, contributing to a possible appreciation
of the investment currency. Thus, an investment currency
could see a subsequent appreciation instead of a depreciation,
as predicted by UIP.
In financial economics there are several phenomena labelled
as puzzles, since the RE paradigm cannot explain them
efficiently. This paper also reveals that to refine modelling
expectations is a fruitful research programme with a huge
potential for explaining these financial anomalies.
PRICE STICKINESS
Abandoning the classic assumption of fully flexible prices
allowed DSGE models to better explain observed
characteristics of the business cycle – especially the estimated
responses to monetary policy shocks – and made these
models able to explain the role of monetary policy in
stabilising business cycles. The elegant results on
developments in the inflation rate, however, are based on a
potentially restrictive assumption for the price setting
behaviour of individual firms: they are allowed to reset their
prices only at randomly arriving times (when the ‘Calvo-
fairy’ touches their shoulder, named after Guillermo Calvo a
professor of Columbia University who developed the model).
An important question of the profession ever since is whether
this assumption is really restrictive in terms of the general
questions of these models. The general agreement is that
during ‘normal’ times in a relatively low inflation
environment, these models capture the important
characteristics of price stickiness. This question was also
asked by Bernardo Guimares and Anton Nakov at the
workshop.
Anton Nakov (Banco de Espana, BE) and his co-author James
Costain (BE) examined the effect of monetary policy shocks
on output in a model that abandons the Calvo assumption
and replaces it with a less restrictive assumption of menu
costs: the firms are allowed to change their prices any time
they feel it necessary after paying a small fixed cost
(reprinting the menu). This so-called ‘state-dependent
pricing’ assumption relative to the standard ‘time-dependent
pricing’ assumption has been given a prominent role in recent
debates, when Robert Lucas (Chicago) and Mikhail Golosov
(MIT) in their 2007 paper showed that standard menu cost
models – calibrated to hit basic characteristics of the observed
consumer price data – would imply negligible output effects
on monetary policy shocks. In his presentation, Anton Nakov
challenged this result – in lockstep with other papers by
Gertler and Leahy, 2007 and Midrigan, 2008. He presented
a model with maintaining the intuitive property that firms are
more likely to change their prices if it is more profitable, but
allowed the data to shape the exact behaviour of this
probability. This modelling technique allowed him to take
into consideration extra characteristics of the observed price
change distribution that Golosov and Lucas failed to match
(such as the amount of small price changes). Extending the
model this way would be of great importance: as the authors
show, this more realistic menu cost model would imply
similar output responses to monetary policy shocks as a
standard Calvo model.
In a paper written with Kevin Sheedy (LSE), Bernardo
Guimaraes (London School of Economics) addresses the issue
of observable frequent sales in consumer prices. Standard
DSGE models assume relatively infrequent price changes (in
every 9 months on average); but if we look at time series of
prices, sales make these price changes more frequent (in every
4 months). Price changes because of sales, however, are
substantially different from infrequent and permanent
‘regular’ price changes: during sales, prices drop by a
relatively large amount and a week or two later they return
exactly to their previous value. This fact prompted many
authors to drop sales from their analysis. In his presentation,
Bernardo Guimaraes gave an elegant theoretical reason to
support this claim. MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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Their model recognises that there can be two substantially
different types of consumers: some that are loyal to certain
brands and some that are bargain hunters: they will look for
the cheapest product, irrespective of its brand. The authors
built a model that rationalises stores holding occasional sales:
they are setting higher prices for their loyal customers at
some points in time and lower prices occasionally for the
bargain hunters. The important finding of the paper is that
even if we assume that firms can set sales prices fully flexibly,
it would not influence the standard DSGE results on the
limited inflation effects of monetary policy shocks. The
reason is that for a firm offering sales, it is more important
how other firms also offering sales set their prices than for it
to respond optimally to the monetary shock: a response to a
monetary shock would result in the firm losing too many
bargain hunter customers. 
ESTIMATION OF BUSINESS CYCLE
MODELS
Standard medium-scale DSGE models, such as that of Smets
and Wouters (2007), contain a high number of parameters
and shocks that need to be estimated. The Bayesian
estimation technique, which is now standard in the
literature, obtains parameter estimates by combining the
authors’ prior knowledge on the parameters
8 with the
information content of the data. If the estimates are close to
the priors, it suggests that the data does not contain enough
extra information on the parameters, or the parameters are
weakly identified. Smets and Wouters (2007) showed that
their model’s forecasting ability is competitive with non-
theoretical, data-based approaches, which is an important
achievement, but if key parameters are weakly identified,
then caution is necessary in the policy application of these
models. 
The presentation by Nikolay Iskrev (Banco de Portugal) dealt
with evaluating the strength of identification in DSGE
models. Parameters are unidentifiable or weakly identified if
the economic features they represent have no empirical
relevance at all, or only very little. This may occur for two
reasons. First, those features are not important at all, or only
moderately important on their own. Second, they are
redundant. If a parameter is redundant, then there is another
parameter, or another set of parameters that can take over its
role. When some parameters are not identifiable or only
weakly identifiable, then different values of these parameters
would make our sample be observed with almost equal
probability.
9
The paper by Iskrev develops a new framework for analysing
parameter identification that can tell us not only if a
parameter is unidentifiable based on the information matrix,
but also the reason for the lack of identification. The main
advantage of the methodology is that it does not involve
timely simulation, as opposed to the method proposed by
Canova and Sala (2009). This feature makes the method
suitable for analysing large and complicated models. After
introducing this methodology, Iskrev (2009) applies it to the
Smets and Wouters (2007) model. 
The results indicate that the parameters in the Smets and
Wouters (2007) model are quite poorly identified. This
finding is in line with that of the previous literature, e.g.
Canova and Sala (2009). Thus, it may be concluded that this
and other similar models are indeed nearly
overparameterised, as it has also been argued by Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009). One could overcome the
problem of weak identification either by modifying the
model, or by collecting richer data. The proposed method of
Iskrev is useful at identifying how the model should be
changed and what kinds of data are needed for a better
identification. And even if one does not include new data in
the analysis explicitly, Bayesian estimation can provide a
coherent way of incorporating some additional information
making the estimates and the policy conclusions more
reliable.
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY
A theoretically appealing feature of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models is the existence of a well-
defined welfare measure. Consequently, the models can be
solved for optimal (welfare-maximising) policies. The paper
presented by Katalin Szilágyi (MNB), written jointly by
Zoltán M. Jakab, Henrik Kucsera and Balázs Világi, explores
optimal monetary policy in a DSGE model for Hungary.
While the solution to the optimal policy problem is a useful
benchmark for monetary policy evaluation, it is not
operational from a central bank’s perspective. To make the
results easier to interpret, the paper approximates the
welfare-maximising policy rule with a set of simple rules that
react only to observable variables. 
The main conclusions are as follows.
Compared to the optimal policy, the empirical rule implies
too much variability of nominal variables. This is a natural
consequence of the modest estimated feedback coefficient to
8 Coming from microeconomic estimates or previous time series data.
9 Or in other words, the likelihood function is not sensitive to the changes of these parameters. Therefore, one way to analyse which of the parameters of a model are
identifiable is to look at the likelihood function, or a transformation of the likelihood function, like the Fisher information matrix.WORKSHOP ON BUSINESS CYCLE MODELING
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inflation. Optimal rules that respond to a few standard and
observable variables (simple rules) can approximate the fully
optimal policy well – that responds to everything – if they
respond strongly to domestic inflation. 
Once monetary policy reacts to changes in domestic inflation,
it should not target the nominal exchange rate separately.
This result depends heavily on the paper’s assumptions about
the production process and the role of imports in the
economy. 
Including wage inflation in the policy rule implies significant
improvement in welfare. This suggests that the welfare loss
associated with sticky wage setting is more severe than those
related to nominal rigidities in product markets. 
The results of the paper build on some crucial assumptions (a
high share of imports in the export sector’s marginal cost,
perfect exchange rate pass-through for import prices, broadly
similar production process for the domestic and the export
sector, no imported consumption). Further research is
needed to examine these assumptions and check the
robustness of its conclusions to relaxing them.
An essential component of the welfare measures and hence
optimal monetary policies is the level of the ‘output gap’,
which is the distance of the current income level from a
theoretically defined potential level that would prevail if
prices and wages were flexible and there were no shocks
causing inefficiencies in the economy (such as shocks to the
price-markups firms add to their prices over their costs).
Potential output, however, is not observable, consequently,
Ulf Söderström (Sveriges Riksbank), in a paper written with
Luca Sala and Antonella Trigari (both at Bocconi University,
Italy), present a DSGE model-based method that helps
obtain estimates. Their main result is that their estimated
potential output level is close to the ones that are usually
obtained by standard time-series smoothing techniques (e.g.
the HP filter). This result is important, because,
theoretically, potential output could develop more
erratically than actual output, and then smoothing would
produce a wrong result. 
A potential caveat of the paper, however, as suggested by
Lawrence Christiano during the discussion of the paper, is
that assuming temporary shocks, as it is standard in these
models, may be an important reason why the authors obtain
potential output series that is smoother than output; if they
assumed permanent shocks instead, then potential output
might turn into a much more volatile series. A further
important conclusion of the authors is that their estimates do
not seem to imply high estimation uncertainty,
consequently, for a given model, they can be fairly sure
about where the potential output lies. A fact that makes this
result weaker, though, is that different model specifications
(such as reinterpreting a shock from a leisure-preference
shock – that is efficient – to a wage markup shock – that is
inefficient – which both influence the labour market
outcome similarly) may lead to substantially different
potential output estimates. The authors argue that if central
bankers do not have strong preconceptions about structural
shocks, these uncertainties about the potential output
estimates should make them increase the weight they put on
inflation stabilisation relative to the one they put on closing
the unobserved output gap. 
Carlos Thomas (Bank of Spain), in a paper written jointly
with Javier Andrés (University of Valencia) and Óscar Arce
(Economic Bureau of Prime Minister), calculated optimal
monetary policy in a model with two distinct financial
frictions. In their model, i) borrowing requires real estate as
collateral, so its price development influences the agents’
borrowing ability and ii) banks are assumed to have some
monopoly power, so their lending rate is higher than the
deposit rate in equilibrium. The two types of frictions
generate interesting interactions in the model: an expected
rise in house prices, for example, leads to lower lending rates
through its effect on banking competition. In the model,
households and entrepreneurs differ by their level of
patience: the less patient entrepreneurs are willing to pay to
households for their savings. The authors find that these
financial frictions introduce both new terms to the central
bank’s welfare function
10 and new trade-offs. This implies
that the central bank should try to counteract the effects of
the financial frictions even if this makes it deviate from its
standard inflation and output-gap stabilisation objective. 
A practical problem with the results, however, is that the new
terms the central bank should respond to are unobservable,
and there are not yet observable variables that could provide
good enough proxies for them. Quantitatively, furthermore,
the effects of the financial frictions were found to be small for
the model calibration, consequently, for small shocks these
frictions might not yet provide enough reason for deviations
from standard rules. 
10 Besides inflation and the output gap terms it should try to make sure that the heterogeneity between entrepreneurs and households in terms of consumption and
real estate holdings are kept as small as possible over the business cycle.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS IN
EMERGING MARKETS: ARE THEY
DIFFERENT?
Modelling the behaviour of emerging economies has always
been controversial: these countries often follow erratic
policies, face such distortions and market failures that make
the standard frameworks (be it a real business cycle, RBC, or
a New-Keynesian DSGE model) inapplicable. In particular,
the seminal small open economy RBC model of Mendoza
(1991) has turned out to suffer from many empirical
shortcomings. The most well-known empirical regularities
are the excessive volatility of consumption relative to GDP,
the strong countercyclicality and persistence of the net
exports to GDP ratio.
11
Recent advances, however, have shown that a small set of
modifications can go a long way in explaining these empirical
regularities. There are two main approaches: Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) proposed an explanation based on the
properties of the productivity process, while Neumeyer and
Perry (2005) put the emphasis on financial frictions. These
two papers have prompted an active research line in
understanding the key differences between emerging and
industrial economy ‘business cycles’. To see the main issues,
let us briefly look at the details of the two competing
explanations.
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) have shown that adding shocks
to the trend component of productivity leads to more volatile
consumption and more countercyclical net exports. The
intuition is simple: a trend shock leads to an increase in the
lifetime income of consumers. As they want to smooth the
extra consumption it allows, they will borrow against their
future income. This results in countercyclical net exports.
Since part of the increase in current consumption is financed
from future earnings, the change in consumption is higher
than the change in current output, hence the excess
consumption volatility. If the trend component of
productivity is more volatile in emerging than in industrial
economies, that can explain the differences in business cycle
facts.
A competing explanation is due to Neumeyer and Perry
(2005), where the explanation is based on financial frictions.
In their model, the real interest rate is decomposed into an
international rate and a country risk component. Country
risk is endogenous (i.e. it is influenced by productivity
developments), but it also amplifies the impact of
productivity shocks through a working capital constraint.
12
This can also explain the same regularities.
The main question thus became whether one can replace the
explanation that ‘the permanent component of productivity
is more volatile in emerging than in industrial countries’ with
a more structural interpretation. A leading candidate is that
emerging markets are special in their limited access to
international financial markets (country risk), in their
financial underdevelopment (credit constraints). The
interaction of productivity and financial market
developments would lead to the observed empirical
regularities, and this would also make the aggregate
productivity series look as if it had a more volatile trend
component. It would thus lead to a ‘weak RBC’
interpretation: ‘Shocks impinging upon emerging countries
are numerous and of different natures, but may be
interpreted as an aggregate shock to total factor productivity.
In addition, the neoclassical model is a good framework for
understanding the transmission of such shocks.’
13
The two most direct ways to proceed are either to run horse
races between productivity-based and financial friction-based
explanations, or to estimate encompassing models and
examine the relative importance of the two factors. The
winning explanation is ambiguous so far: Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006) add a restricted version of endogenous
interest rate spreads (driven only by the transitory
component of productivity) to their benchmark model and
find that this kind of financial friction cannot replace the
trend shock explanation. Cicco, Pancrazi and Uribe (2007)
allow for exogenous interest rate shocks and an estimated
elasticity of the country premium to indebtedness. They find
that such a model completely eliminates the need for having
more volatile trend productivity shocks in emerging
economies. Chang and Fernandéz (2009) – the paper
included in the workshop’s programme, presented by Andrés
Fernandéz from Rutgers University (US) – carry out a very
careful Bayesian estimation and model comparison exercise,
in which they consider endogenous interest rate spreads, a
fixed elasticity of the risk premium to indebtedness and
working capital requirements. Though they do not do an
explicit horse race between the two explanations, their
encompassing model assigns a dominant role for financial
frictions in shaping fluctuations, and trend shocks turn out to
be less important. 
In his discussion, Péter Benczúr of the MNB pointed out
that most of the existing literature limits its attention to
11 Benczúr and Rátfai (2005) confirm the same pattern for Central and Eastern European countries.
12This constraint means that firms must finance part of their wage bill in advance.
13 Cicco, J., Pancrazi, R, and M. Uribe (2009), slides posted at http://www.columbia.edu/~mu2166/rbc_emerging/rbc_emerging.html.WORKSHOP ON BUSINESS CYCLE MODELING
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comparing the US and Canada with Argentina and Mexico.
As countries are highly heterogeneous in their business
cycle properties,
14 one should be careful in drawing
conclusions based on such a limited comparison. He also
emphasised the need for having meaningful and structural
financial frictions, and a complex interaction between the
financial and the real side of the economy. Nevertheless, he
strongly believes that a sufficiently enriched version of the
basic open economy real business cycle model can explain
many though far from all aspects of emerging market
economic fluctuations.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
AND COUNTRY PORTFOLIOS IN OPEN
MACRO MODELS
A number of papers in this year’s workshop addressed open
economy aspects in business cycle models. They laid out
methods with which our analysis of the determinants of
structure and composition of country portfolios can be
improved, applied existing methods to shed light on puzzles
like the equity home bias
15 or looked at the role of
international financial markets assumptions for
macroeconomic policy. 
Behind the background of increasing international financial
linkages, with gross asset and liability positions
16 having
grown rapidly in the last two decades, there are a number of
questions that are becoming increasingly crucial to address in
models of the open economy. These include, among others,
the determinants of the size and composition of gross
portfolio flows; whether standard theories can account for
the observed structure of portfolio holdings; or if the large
size of gross positions makes it likely that the portfolio
composition itself will affect macroeconomic outcomes.
Work in this area of research has, therefore, focused both on
improving the methods of solving for country portfolios and
on applying these methods to the recurrent topics and
puzzles in this literature such as, for example, the empirical
findings of a strong equity home bias or a low degree of
international risk sharing.
17
Until recently, existing open economy macroeconomic
models have, to a large extent, ignored portfolio
composition, and have limited themselves to analysing
financial linkages between countries in terms of net foreign
assets, with no distinction made between assets and liabilities.
The ways international financial markets have been modelled
and what set of available asset to allow in open economy
macro models were largely constrained by technical
difficulties. Portfolio theory tells us that the composition of a
portfolio depends on the risk properties of the available
assets. The typical approximation methods for DSGE models
take the non-stochastic steady state as an approximation
point, that is, they analyse the dynamic properties of the
model economy around a long-run equilibrium that is
reached if no disturbances hit the economy. At such point, by
definition, there is nothing that distinguishes one asset from
another and there is nothing that pins down what asset a
country’s agents would like to hold: the portfolio is
indeterminate. Recently, there have been major advances in
this literature: a number of authors, most notably Devereux
and Sutherland (2007, 2008),
18 have suggested techniques to
derive the optimal portfolio composition in dynamic macro
models. They show that using standard first-order solution
techniques it is possible to determine the ‘near-stochastic’
optimal portfolio allocation around which the non-linear
dynamic model can be approximated. Furthermore, they
show that using simple second-order approximation
techniques, it is possible to characterise the dynamics of this
portfolio.
In a paper written jointly with Luca Dedola (ECB), Giovanni
Lombardo (ECB) extends the results of the Devereux and
Sutherland (DS) method along several dimensions. While the
DS method requires for its solution that the portfolio
allocation only enter in the equilibrium conditions
multiplicatively with excess returns, the authors show that in
certain cases of economic interest one needs to apply a more
general solution technique. This is the case, for example, if one
were interested in solving a Ramsey optimal policy problem
19
with multiple agents and assets under incomplete markets. In
14 Benczúr and Rátfai (2009) document this heterogeneity.
15 Home equity bias refers to the strong empirical finding that countries tend to hold a large fraction of their overall equity portfolio in terms of domestic equity.
16That is, the stock of total external assets or the stock of total external liabilities. In contrast, the net foreign asset position is defined as the difference of gross assets
over gross liabilities. 
17The degree of international risk sharing determines how sensitive a country’s consumption behaviour is in response to country specific shocks. Under full risk sharing
all countries benefit equally from a shock that occurs in any country, in the sense that the utility of an extra (marginal) unit of consumption is equalised across
countries. If the degree of international risk sharing is imperfect, the world allocation is inefficient in that the marginal utility of consumption in one country will be
generally larger or smaller than in other countries.
18 Tille and van Wincoop (2007) present an essentially identical solution method (by proposing iterative techniques) that allows a general class of open economy model
with multiple assets to be solved using standard algorithms, while Devereux and Saito (2006), Evans and Hnatkovska (2006)and Judd et al. (2001)describe alternative
solution approaches.
19That is, a Ramsey policy problem is a setup in which a benevolent planner (the policy-maker) that is fully aware how the economy behaves and that takes this into
account, optimally chooses a policy instrument such as to maximise lifetime utility of agents.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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particular, they show that when the portfolio terms appear
only in such a way that they enter multiplicatively with excess
returns – or in general terms that are zero at the non-stochastic
steady state (the ‘Zero Jacobian case’) – then the DS method
can be applied and the zero-order (steady state portfolio) and
first-order portfolio (portfolio dynamics) can be solved
separably, and in one step after another. In case this is violated
and the portfolio terms also show up multiplying terms that are
non-zero at steady state (the ‘Singular Jacobian case’), the zero-
order (constant) and first-order (dynamic) portfolio need to be
solved for simultaneously, in an iterative algorithm. The paper
further clarifies the relations between the Devereux-Sutherland
methodology and the approach proposed by Judd and Guu
(2001), showing that both approaches share the same formal
foundations. In a number of examples the authors show how
their extensions of the DS method are of interest not only per
se, but can be used in a number of applications in economics
such as solving problems of finding the optimal monetary
policy (Ramsey problems), models involving some collateral
constraint problems or in economies with heterogeneous
agents.
A contribution that evaluates the ability to generate equity
home bias in a sticky price model with capital accumulation
was presented by Ebrahim Rahbari (London Business School,
LBS). In the model, world agents face real exchange rate risk
and human capital risk (risk from labour income). The author
considers agents to be able to hold either (domestic or foreign)
equities or (domestic or foreign) nominal bonds. Crucial for
the understanding of how countries would like to hold their
portfolios is to understand what types of risk can be hedged
with what assets held. He shows that, in response to a
productivity increase, labour income falls – when economies
are faced with price rigidities – while dividends increase as a
result of the now higher profits (profits increase both because
of the higher productivity and the lower wage bill that needs
to be paid out). As a result, domestic equity provides a high
payoff at times when labour income is low, and is a good
hedge against labour income risk. A similar (negative) co-
movement of labour income and dividends can result from
investment efficiency shocks that temporarily increase the
benefits of ongoing increased investment. This decreases
dividends and raises labour effort, making home equity also a
good hedge in response to this type of shock. But what about
hedging against real exchange rate risk? It turns out that the
assumption of nominal bonds as available assets means that
they are not very effective hedges for real exchange rate risk
(nor for human capital risk), and, as a result, the position in
equities will reflect both the desire to hedge human capital
risk and also real exchange rate risk. Rahbari shows that even
though a sticky price model with capital accumulation can
generate a home equity bias, the portfolios are not stable, but
depend strongly on specifications of preference parameters
(which determine the extent of real exchange rate risk). The
empirical analysis of the paper, namely, a vector
autoregressive model estimated using sign restrictions,
20 seems
to support the idea that home equity bias is driven by the
desire to hedge human capital risk and not real exchange rate
risk for a set of industrial countries. 
Robert Kollmann (European Centre for Advanced Research
in Economics and Statistics, ECARES, Université Libre de
Bruxelles), in joint work with Nicolas Coeurdacier (LBS)
and Philippe Martin (Sciences Po, Paris), also analyses the
issue of equity home bias using a two-country flexible price
business cycle model in which agents can choose among
domestic and foreign equities and domestic and foreign
bonds to hedge the risks they face. Similarly to the previous
contribution, the risk in this model world originates from
the presence of productivity shocks and from shocks to the
marginal efficiency to investment (which affect the benefits
from investing an extra unit). The available assets considered
are again (domestic and foreign) equities and bonds, but a
crucial difference is that the latter are real bonds. In the case
of real bonds, the relative return on real bonds is perfectly
correlated with the real exchange rate. Therefore, bond
holdings are used to hedge against movements in the terms
of trade or the real exchange rate, while equity home bias,
on the other hand, results from agents’ incentive to hedge
risk that is unrelated to movements in the terms of trade.
This is, in particular, labour income risk: a home investment
boom induced by temporarily higher investment efficiency
leads to a decline in home dividends at a time when output
and, as a result, employment increase. Local dividends and
local wage income are negatively related, at a constant terms
of trade. The author shows that this co-movement also finds
empirical support for a set of industrial countries. The equity
positions generated from the model setup are not only
realistic but also stable, in the sense that they do not hinge
on preference specifications: as terms of trade movements
are perfectly correlated with the difference between payoffs
on Home versus Foreign bonds, they are hedged through the
bonds portfolio. Equity home bias is generated only because
they are a good hedge against labour income risk. The paper
then goes beyond the analysis of equity home bias and looks
at the model’s implications for portfolio dynamics,
20 A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is an econometric model in which the times series of (several) economic variables are jointly explained by past observations of
these variables. As the way these economic variables may affect each other is typically not unique, there needs to be some additional structure imposed on the VAR,
that is, it needs to be identified. An identification by ‘sign restrictions’imposes this structure by forcing the impulse responses (to a shock) of the VAR model to behave
qualitatively (a variable should increase or decrease) as we believe they should according to what we believe to be economically meaningful.WORKSHOP ON BUSINESS CYCLE MODELING
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contrasting them to a number of empirical stylised facts on
international capital flows. The model is shown to perform
reasonably well also in terms of matching portfolio
dynamics, such as the business cycle properties of the
valuation adjusted current account or the negative
correlation between the change in the net equity position
and the net bond position.
Katrin Rabitsch (MNB and CEU) presented a paper showing
that the degree of international risk sharing across countries
can be important in shaping optimal monetary policy in an
open economy, and that the closed economy prescriptions of
price stability as the optimal policy do not necessarily
translate into the open economy. The reason for this finding
is that policy-makers may not only be interested in stabilising
domestic prices but also in affecting international relative
prices (the terms of trade or the real exchange rate)
strategically in their advantage. How to strategically affect
the terms of trade depends on the amount of risk sharing
obtained, which, in turn, depends on the assumptions on
international financial markets together with trade elasticity
– the elasticity of intratemporal substitution.
21 In particular,
the author studies financial market assumptions of complete
financial markets, financial autarky, and an incomplete
markets-bond economy, looking over a wide range of the
elasticity, and contrasts differences between policy
coordination across countries and the case in which
countries’ policy-makers act in an uncoordinated fashion. She
emphasises that (producer) price stability is a very special
case, which only obtains when financial markets are complete
and policy-makers act co-ordinately or when risk sharing
across countries is automatically obtained through terms of
trade movements, as in Cole and Obstfeld (1991). In all other
cases, terms of trade considerations lead the policy-maker to
deviate from price stability. Because independent policy-
makers generally fail to take into account the effect of the
terms of trade on the other country’s welfare, there are
welfare gains from coordination to be achieved. These turn
out to be larger under complete risk sharing when goods are
substitutes and also larger under financial autarky when
goods are complements (as with very low substitution
elasticities wealth effects under incomplete markets become
increasingly important). Also, in a world of incomplete risk
sharing a policy-maker is shown to find it optimal to
manoeuvre international relative price responses that are
closer to the ones that would occur in the efficient complete
markets world, improving over the flexible price (but
incomplete markets) allocation. 
CONCLUSION
The workshop provided an excellent opportunity for
researchers of business cycle models and central bankers to
meet and discuss the potential of the current DSGE models,
understand their caveats and agree on the necessary avenues
for future research. The main conclusion of the workshop
was that even though current versions of the business cycle
models are useful in ‘normal’ times, the current crisis requires
serious rethinking of the standard ingredients and policy
conclusions of these models. 
Financial markets, for example, should be inserted into the
standard versions of these models: the already developed
‘financial accelerator mechanism’ provides a potentially
successful method for this. The debate has already started
about how central banks should optimally set their monetary
policy if financial markets are present both as sources and
propagators of business cycle shocks. 
There is also an ongoing debate about whether the standard
assumption of rational expectations, which assumes – for
consistency’s sake – that agents know everything about the
structure of the model-economy, is too strong, and agents
should rather be assumed to continuously learn about the
behaviour of the economy (as economists do when facing
serious recessions such as the current one). 
The workshop also provided a great opportunity for
researchers to present their results on topics such as the
assumption of price stickiness, optimal policy questions,
special issues related to open and emerging market
economies, current developments in modelling international
portfolio choices and problems with the estimation of these
models that can greatly contribute to the structure and
empirical validity of the standard DSGE models of the future. 
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